FastPay: High-Performance Byzantine Fault Tolerant Settlement by Baudet, Mathieu et al.
FastPay: High-Performance Byzantine Fault Tolerant Settlement
Mathieu Baudet ∗
Facebook Calibra
George Danezis
Facebook Calibra
Alberto Sonnino
Facebook Calibra
Abstract
FastPay allows a set of distributed authorities, some of which
are Byzantine, to maintain a high-integrity and availability set-
tlement system for pre-funded payments. It can be used to set-
tle payments in a native unit of value (crypto-currency), or as
a financial side-infrastructure to support retail payments in fiat
currencies. FastPay is based on Byzantine Consistent Broad-
cast as its core primitive, foregoing the expenses of full atomic
commit channels (consensus). The resulting system has low-
latency for both confirmation and payment finality. Remark-
ably, each authority can be sharded across many machines
to allow unbounded horizontal scalability. Our experiments
demonstrate intra-continental confirmation latency of less
than 100ms, making FastPay applicable to point of sale pay-
ments. In laboratory environments, we achieve over 80,000
transactions per second with 20 authorities—surpassing the
requirements of current retail card payment networks, while
significantly increasing their robustness.
1 Introduction
Real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS) [3] constitute the
most common approach to financial payments in closed bank-
ing networks, that is, between reputable institutions. In con-
trast, blockchain platforms have proposed a radically different
paradigm, allowing account holders to interact directly with
an online, yet highly secure, distributed ledger. Blockchain
approaches aim to enable new use cases such as personal e-
wallets or private transactions, and generally provide ecosys-
tems more favorable to users. However, until now, such
open, distributed settlement solutions have come at a high
performance cost and questionable scalability compared to
traditional, closed RTGS systems.
FastPay is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) real-time gross
settlement (RTGS) system. It enables authorities to jointly
maintain account balances and settle pre-funded retail pay-
ments between accounts. It supports extremely low-latency
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confirmation (sub-second) of eventual transaction finality, ap-
propriate for physical point-of-sale payments. It also provides
extremely high capacity, comparable with peak retail card
network volumes, while ensuring gross settlement in real-
time. FastPay eliminates counterparty and credit risks of net
settlement and removes the need for intermediate banks, and
complex financial contracts between them, to absorb these
risks. FastPay can accommodate arbitrary capacities through
efficient sharding architectures at each authority. Unlike any
traditional RTGS, and more like permissioned blockchains,
FastPay can tolerate up to f Byzantine failures out of a total
of 3 f + 1 authorities, and retain both safety, liveness, and
high-performance.
FastPay can be deployed in a number of settings. First,
it may be used as a settlement layer for a native token and
crypto-currency, in a standalone fashion. Second, it may be
deployed as a side-chain of another crypto-currency, or as
a high performance settlement layer on the side of an estab-
lished RTGS to settle fiat retail payments. In this paper we
present this second functionality in detail, since it exercises
all features of the system, both payments between FastPay
accounts, as well as payments into and out of the system.
Contributions. We make the following contributions:
• The FastPay design is novel in that if forgoes full consen-
sus; it leverages the semantics of payments to minimize
shared state between accounts and to increase the con-
currency of asynchronous operations; and it supports
sharded authorities.
• We provide proofs of safety and liveness in a Byzantine
and fully asynchronous network setting. We show that
FastPay keeps all its properties despite the lack of total
ordering, or asynchrony of updates to recipient accounts.
• We experimentally demonstrate comparatively very high
throughput and low latency, as well as the robustness of
the system under conditions of extremely high concur-
rency and load.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 intro-
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duces real-time gross settlement systems, and permissioned
blockchains. Section 3 introduces the entities within FastPay,
their interactions, and the security properties and threat model.
Section 4 details the design of FastPay both as a standalone
system, and operated in conjunction with a Primary. Section 5
discusses safety and liveness. Section 6 briefly describes the
implementation of the FastPay prototype. Section 7 provides
a full performance evaluation of FastPay as we modulate its
security parameters and load. Section 8 discusses key open is-
sues such as privacy, governance mechanisms and economics
of the platform. Section 9 covers the related work, both in
terms of traditional financial systems and crypto-currencies.
Section 10 concludes.
2 Background
Real-time gross settlement systems (RTGS) [3] are the back-
bone of modern financial systems. Commercial banks use
them to maintain an account with central banks and settle
large value payments.
RTGS systems are limited in their capacity1, making them
unsuitable for settling low-value high-volume retail pay-
ments directly. Such retail payments are deferred: banks
exchange information bilaterally about pending payments (of-
ten through SWIFT [31,44]), they aggregate and net payments,
and only settle net balances through an RTGS, often daily.
The often quoted volume figure of around 80,000 transactions
per second for retail card networks [24, 45] represents the
rate at which ‘promises’ for payments are exchanged between
banks, and not settled payments.
Traditional RTGS systems are implemented as monolithic
centralized services operated by a single authority, and must
employ a number of technical and organizational internal con-
trols to ensure they are reliable (through a primary-replica
architecture with manual switch over) and correct—namely
ensuring availability and integrity. Traditionally only regu-
lated entities have accounts in those systems. This result in
a Balkanized global financial system where financial institu-
tions connect to multiple RTGS, directly or indirectly through
corresponding banks, to execute international payments.
Blockchain-based technologies, starting with Bitcoin [33]
in 2009, provide more open settlement systems often com-
bined with their own digital tokens to represent value. Permis-
sionless blockchains have been criticized for their low perfor-
mance [16] in terms of capacity and finality times. However,
a comparison with established settlement systems leads to a
more nuanced assessment. Currently, Ethereum [47] can pro-
cess 15 transactions per second. The actual average daily load
on the EU ECB TARGET2 system is about 10 transactions
per second [20] (in 2018) which is a comparable figure (and
lower than the peak advertised capacity of 500 transaction
1For example, the relatively recent European Central Bank TARGET2
system has a maximum capacity of 500 transactions per second [20]
per second). However, it falls very short of the advertised
transaction rate of 80,000 transaction per second peak for
retail payment networks—even though this figure does not
represents settled transactions. The stated ambitions of per-
missionless projects is to be able to settle transactions at this
rate on an open and permissionless network, which remains
an open research challenge [46].
Permissioned blockchains [4, 6] provide a degree of
decentralization—allowing multiple authorities to jointly op-
erate a ledger—at the cost of some off-chain governance to
control who maintains the blockchain. The most prominent
of such proposals is the Libra network [13], developed by
the Libra association. Other technical efforts include Hyper-
ledger [11], Corda [9] and Tendermint [10]. Those systems
are based on traditional notions of Byzantine Fault Tolerant
state machine replication (or sometimes consensus with crash-
failures only), which presupposes an atomic commit channel
(often referred as ‘consensus’) that sequences all transactions.
Such architectures allow for higher capacities than Bitcoin
and Ethereum. LibraBFT, for example, aims for 1,000 trans-
actions per second at peak capacity [1,19]; this exceeds many
RTGS systems, but is still below the peak volumes for retail
payment systems. A latency of multiple seconds when it
comes to transaction finality is competitive with RTGS, but is
unusable for retail payment at physical points of sale.
3 Overview
To illustrate its full capabilities, we describe FastPay as a
side chain of a primary RTGS holding the primary records of
accounts. We call such a primary ledger the Primary for short,
and its accounts the Primary accounts. The Primary can be
instantiated in two ways: (i) as a programmable blockchain,
through smart contracts, like Ethereum [47] or Libra [13]. The
Primary can also be instantiated (ii) as a traditional monolithic
RTGS operated by a central bank. In this case the compo-
nents interfacing with FastPay are implemented as database
transactions within the Primary. In both cases FastPay acts
as a side infrastructure to enable pre-funded retail payments.
FastPay can also operate with a native asset, without a primary
ledger. In this case sub-protocols involving the Primary are
superfluous, since all value is held within FastPay accounts
and never transferred out or into the system.
3.1 Participants
FastPay involves two types of participants: (i) authorities,
and (ii) account owners (users, for short). All participants
generate a key pair consisting of a private signature key and
the corresponding public verification key. As a side-chain,
FastPay requires a smart contract on the main blockchain, or
a software component on an RTGS system that can authorize
payments based on the signatures of a threshold of authorities
from a committee with fixed membership.
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By definition, an honest authority always follows the Fast-
Pay protocol, while a faulty (or Byzantine) one may deviate
arbitrarily. We present the FastPay protocol for 3 f +1 equally-
trusted authorities, assuming a fixed (but unknown) subset
of at most f Byzantine authorities. In this setting, a quorum
is defined as any subset of 2 f +1 authorities. (As for many
BFT protocols, our proofs only use the classical properties of
quorums thus apply to all Byzantine quorum systems [32].)
When a protocol message is signed by a quorum of author-
ities, it is said to be certified: we call such a jointly signed
message a certificate.
3.2 Accounts and Actions
A FastPay account is identified by its address, which we
instantiate as the cryptographic hash of its public verification
key. The state of a FastPay account is affected by four main
high-level actions:
1. Receiving funds from a Primary account.
2. Transferring funds to a Primary account.
3. Receiving funds from a FastPay account.
4. Transferring funds to a FastPay account.
FastPay also supports two read-only actions that are neces-
sary to ensure liveness despite faults: reading the state of an
account at a FastPay authority, and obtaining a certificate for
any action executed by an authority.
3.3 Protocol Messages
The FastPay protocol consists of transactions on the Primary,
denoted with letter T , and network requests that users send
to FastPay authorities, which we call orders, and denote with
letter O. Users are responsible for broadcasting their orders
to authorities and for processing the corresponding responses.
The authorities are passive and do not communicate directly
with each other.
Transfer orders. All transfers initiated by a FastPay account
start with a transfer order O including the following fields:
• The sender’s FastPay address, written sender(O).
• The recipient, either a FastPay or a Primary address,
written recipient(O).
• A non-negative amount to transfer, written amount(O).
• A sequence number sequence(O).
• Optional user-provided data.
• A signature by the sender over the above data.
Authorities respond to valid transfer orders by counter-
signing them (see next section for validity checks). A quorum
of such signatures is meant to be aggregated into a transfer
certificate, noted C.
Notations. We write O = value(C) for the original transfer
order O certified by C. For simplicity, we omit the oper-
ator value when the meaning is clear, e.g. sender(C) =
sender(value(C)). FastPay addresses are denoted with let-
ters a and b. We use α for authorities and by extension for
the shards of authorities.
3.4 Security Properties and Threat Model
FastPay guarantees the following security properties:
• Safety: No units of value are ever created or destroyed;
they are only transferred between accounts.
• Authenticity: Only the owner of an account may trans-
fer value out of the account.
• Availability: Correct users can always transfer funds
from their account.
• Redeemability: A transfer to FastPay or Primary is guar-
anteed to eventually succeed whenever a valid transfer
certificate has already been produced.
• Public Auditability: There is sufficient public crypto-
graphic evidence for the state of FastPay to be audited
for correctness by any party.
• Worst-case Efficiency: Byzantine authorities (or users)
cannot significantly delay operations from correct users.
The above properties are maintained under a number of
security assumptions: (i) there are at most f Byzantine au-
thorities out of 3 f + 1 total authorities. (ii) The network is
fully asynchronous, and the adversary may arbitrarily delay
and reorder messages [18]. However, messages are eventually
delivered. (iii) Users may behave arbitrarily but availability
only holds for correct users (defined in Section 4.5). (iv) The
Primary provides safety and liveness (when FastPay is used
in conjunction with it). We further discuss the security prop-
erties of FastPay in Section 5.
4 The FastPay Protocol
FastPay authorities hold and persist the following information.
Authorities. The state of an authority α consists of the fol-
lowing information:
• The authority name, signature and verification keys.
• The committee, represented as a set of authorities and
their verification keys.
• A map accounts(α) tracking the current account state
of each FastPay address a in use (see below).
• An integer value, noted last_transaction(α), refer-
ring to the last transaction that paid funds into the Pri-
mary. This is used by authorities to synchronize FastPay
accounts with funds from the Primary (see Section 4.3).
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FastPay accounts. The state of a FastPay account a within
the authority α consists of the following:
• The public verification key of a, used to authenticate
spending actions.
• An integer value representing the balance of payment,
written balancea(α).
• An integer value tracking the expected sequence num-
ber for the next spending action to be created, written
next_sequencea(α). This value starts at 0.
• A field pendinga(α) tracking the last transfer order O
signed by a such that the authority α considers O as
pending confirmation, if any; and absent otherwise.
• A list of certificates, written confirmeda(α), tracking
all the transfer certificates C that have been confirmed
by α and such that sender(C) = a. One such certifi-
cate is available for each sequence number n (0≤ n <
next_sequencea(α)).
• A list of synchronization orders, synchronizeda(α),
having transferred funds from the Primary to account a.
(See Section 4.3.)
We also define receiveda(α) as the list of confirmed certifi-
cates for transfers received by a. Formally, receiveda(α) =
{C s.t. ∃b.C ∈ confirmedb(α) and recipient(C) = a}.
We assume arbitrary size integers. Although FastPay does
not let users overspend, (temporary) negative balances for
account states are allowed for technical reasons discussed in
Section 5. When present, a pending (signed) transfer order
O = pendinga(α) effectively locks the sequence number of
the account a and prevents α from accepting new transfer
orders from a until confirmation, that is, until a valid trans-
fer certificate C such that value(C) = O is received. This
mechanism can be seen as the ‘Signed Echo Broadcast’ im-
plementation of a Byzantine consistent broadcast on the label
(account, next sequence number) [12].
Storage considerations. The information contained in the
lists of certificates confirmeda(α) and receiveda(α) and
in the synchronization orders synchronizeda(α) is self-
authenticated—being signed by a quorum of authorities and
by the Primary, respectively. Remarkably, this means that
authorities may safely outsource these lists to an external
high-availability data store. Therefore, FastPay authorities
only require a constant amount of local storage per account,
rather than a linear amount in the number of transactions.
4.1 Transferring Funds within FastPay
FastPay operates by implementing a Byzantine consistent
broadcast channel per account, specifically using a ‘Signed
Echo Broadcast’ variant (Algorithm 3.17 in [12]). It operates
in two phases and all messages are relayed by the initiating
user. Consistent Broadcast ensures Validity, No duplication,
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Figure 1: Transfer of funds from FastPay to FastPay.
Integrity, and Consistency. It always terminates when initiated
by a correct user. However, if a FastPay user equivocates,
current operations may fail, and the funds present on the users
account may become inaccessible.
Transferring funds. Figure 1 illustrates a transfer of funds
within FastPay. To transfers funds to another FastPay account,
the sender creates a FastPay transfer order (O) with the next se-
quence number in their account, and signs it. They then send
the FastPay transfer order to all authorities. Each authority
checks (Ê) (i) that the signature is valid, (ii) that no previous
transfer is pending (or is for the same transfer), (iii) that the
amount is positive, (iv) that the sequence number matches the
expected next one (sequence(O) = next_sequencea(α)),
and (iv) that the balance (balancea(α)) is sufficient (Ë).
Then, it records the new transfer as pending and sends back a
signature on the transfer order (Ì) which is also stored. The
authority algorithm to handle transfer orders, corresponding
to step Ë, is presented in Figure 2.
The user collects the signatures from a quorum of authori-
ties, and uses them along the FastPay transfer order to form a
transfer certificate. The sender provides this transfer certifi-
cate to the recipient as proof that the payment will proceed
(Î). To conclude the transaction, the sender (Í) or the re-
cipient (Ï) must broadcast the transfer certificate (C) to the
authorities (we call this a confirmation order)2.
Upon reception of a confirmation order for the current
sequence number, each authority α (Ð) (i) checks that a
quorum of signatures was reached, (ii) decreases the bal-
ance of the sender, (iii) increments the sequence number
(next_sequencea(α) + 1) to ensure ‘deliver once’ seman-
tics, and (iv) sets the pending order to None (pendinga(α) =
None). Each authority α also (v) adds the certificate to the list
confirmeda(α), and (vi) increases the balance of the recipi-
2Aggregating signed transfer orders into a transfer certificate does not
requires knowledge of any secret; therefore, anyone (and not only the sender
or the recipient) can broadcast the transfer certificate to the authorities to
conclude the transaction.
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ent account asynchronously (i.e. without sequencing this write
in relation to any specific payments from this account across
authorities). The authority algorithm to handle confirmation
orders (as in step Ð) is presented in Figure 2.
In Section 5 and Appendix A, we show that the FastPay
protocol is safe thanks to the semantics of payments into an
account and their commutative properties. FastPay is a signifi-
cant simplification and deviation from an orthodox application
of Guerraroui et al. [22], where accounts are single-writer ob-
jects and all write actions are mediated by the account owner.
FastPay allows payments to be executed after a single consis-
tent broadcast, rather than requiring recipients to sequence
payments into their accounts separately. This reduces both
latency and the state necessary to prevent replays.
Payment finality. Once a transfer certificate could be formed,
namely 2 f + 1 authorities signed a transfer order, no other
order can be processed for an account until the corresponding
confirmation order is submitted. Technically, the payment is
final: it cannot be canceled, and will proceed eventually. As a
result, showing a transfer certificate to a recipient convinces
them that the payment will proceed. We call the showing
of a transfer certificate to a recipient a confirmation, and
then subsequently submitting the confirmation order, to move
funds, settlement. Confirmation requires only a single round
trip to a quorum of authorities resulting in very low-latency
(see Section 7), and giving the system its name.
Proxies, gateways and crash recovery. The protocols as
presented involve the sender being on-line and mediating all
communications. However, the only action that the sender
must perform personally is forming a transfer order, requiring
their signature. All subsequent operations, including sending
the transfer order to the authorities, forming a certificate, and
submitting a confirmation order can be securely off-loaded
to a proxy trusted only for liveness. Alternatively, a trans-
fer order may be given to a merchant (or payment gateway)
that drives the protocol to conclusion. In fact, any party in
possession of a signed transfer order may attempt to make a
payment progress concurrently. And as long as the sender is
correct the protocol will conclude (and if not may only lock
the account of the faulty sender).
This provides significant deployment and implementation
flexibility. A sender client may be implemented in hardware
(in a NFC smart card) that only signs transfer orders. These
are then provided to a gateway that drives the rest of the
protocol. Once the transfer order is signed and handed over to
the gateway, the sender may go off-line or crash. Authorities
may also attempt to complete the protocol upon receiving
a valid transfer order. Finally, the protocol recovers from
user crash failures: anyone may request a transfer order that
is partially confirmed from any authority, proceed to form a
certificate, and submit a confirmation order to complete the
protocol.
fn handle_transfer_order(α, O) -> Result {
/// Check shard and signature.
ensure!(α.in_shard(sender(O)));
ensure!(O.has_valid_signature());
/// Obtain sender account.
match accounts(α).get(sender(O)) {
None => bail!(),
Some(account) => {
/// Check if the same order is already
pending.
if let Some(pending) = account.pending {
ensure!(pending.transfer == O);
return Ok();
}
ensure!(account.next_sequence == sequence(O));
ensure!(account.balance >= amount(O));
/// Sign and store new transfer.
account.pending = Some(α.sign(O));
return Ok();
} } }
fn handle_confirmation_order(α, C)
-> Result<Option <CrossShardUpdate >> {
/// Check shard and certificate.
ensure!(α.in_shard(sender(C)));
ensure!(C.is_valid(α.committee));
let O = value(C);
/// Obtain sender account.
let sender_account =
accounts(α).get(sender(O))
.or_insert(AccountState::new());
/// Ignore old certificates.
if sender_account.next_sequence > sequence(O) {
return Ok(None);
}
/// Check sequence number and balance.
ensure!(sender_account.next_sequence == sequence(O));
ensure!(sender_account.balance >= amount(O));
/// Update sender account.
sender_account.balance -= amount(O);
sender_account.next_sequence += 1;
sender_account.pending = None;
sender_account.confirmed.push(C);
/// Update recipient locally or cross-shard.
let recipient = match recipient(O) {
Address::FastPay(recipient) => recipient ,
Address::Primary(_) => { return Ok(None) }
};
/// Same shard: read and update the recipient.
if α.in_shard(recipient) {
let recipient_account = accounts(α).get(recipient)
.or_insert(AccountState::new());
recipient_account.balance += amount(O);
return Ok(None);
}
/// Other shard: request a cross-shard update.
let update = CrossShardUpdate {
shard_id: α.which_shard(recipient),
transfer_certificate: C,
};
Ok(Some(update))
}
Figure 2: Authority algorithms for handling transfer and confirmation orders.
(The cross-shard update logic is presented in Appendix B.)
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4.2 Sharding authorities
FastPay requires minimal state sharing between accounts,
and allows for a very efficient sharding at each authority by
account. The consistent broadcast channel is executed on a
per-account basis. Therefore, the protocol does not require
any state sharing between accounts (and shards) up to the
point where a valid confirmation order has to be settled to
transfer funds between FastPay accounts. On settlement, the
sender account is decremented and the funds are deposited
into the account of the recipient, requiring interaction between
at most two shards (second algorithm of Figure 2).
Paying into an account can be performed asynchronously,
and is an operation that cannot fail (if the account does not
exist it is created on the spot). Therefore, the shard man-
aging the recipient account only needs to be notified of the
confirmed payment through a reliable, deliver once, authenti-
cated, point to point channel (that can be implemented using
a message authentication code, inter-shard sequence num-
ber, re-transmission, and acknowledgments) from the sender
shard. This is a greatly simplified variant of a two-phase
commit protocol coordinated by the sender shard (for details
see the Presume Nothing and Last Agent Commit optimiza-
tions [29,41]). Modifying the validity condition of the consis-
tent broadcast to ensure the recipient account exists (or any
other precondition on the recipient account) would require a
full two-phase commit before an authority signs a transfer or-
der, and can be implemented while still allowing for (slightly
less) efficient sharding.
The algorithms in fig. 2 implement sharding. An authority
shard checks that the transfer order (O) or certificate (C) is to
be handled by a specific shard and otherwise rejects it without
mutating its state. Handling confirmation orders depends
on whether a recipient account is on the same shard. If so,
the recipient account is updated locally. Otherwise, a cross
shard message is created for the recipient shard to update the
account (see code in the Appendix for this operation).
The ability to shard each authority has profound impli-
cations: increasing the number of shards at each authority
increases the theoretical throughput linearly, while latency
remains constant. Our experimental evaluation confirms this
experimentally (see Section 7).
4.3 Interfacing with the Primary
We describe the protocols required to couple FastPay with
the Primary, namely transferring funds from the Primary to a
FastPay account, and conversely from a FastPay to a Primary
account. We refer throughout to the logic on the Primary
as a smart contract, and the primary store of information
as the blockchain. A traditional RTGS would record this
state and manage it in conventional ways using databases
and stored procedures, rather than a blockchain and smart
contracts. We write σ for the state of the ‘blockchain’ at
a given time, and transactions(σ) for the set of FastPay
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Figure 3: Transfer of funds from the Primary to FastPay.
transactions T already processed by the blockchain.
Smart contract. The smart contract mediating interactions
with the Primary requires the following data to be persisted
in the blockchain:
• The FastPay committee composition: a set of authority
names and their verification keys.
• A map of accounts where each FastPay address is
mapped to its current Primary state (see below).
• The total balance of funds in the smart contract, written
total_balance(σ).
• The transaction index of the last transaction
that added funds to the smart contract, written
last_transaction(σ).
Accounts. The Primary state of a FastPay account a consists
of the set of sequence numbers of transfers already executed
from this account to the Primary. This set is called the redeem
log of a and written redeemeda(σ).
Adding funds from the Primary to FastPay. Figure 3
shows a transfer of funds from the Primary to FastPay. The
owner of the FastPay account (or anyone else) starts by send-
ing a payment to the FastPay smart contract using a Primary
transaction (Ê). This transaction is called a funding transac-
tion, and includes the recipient FastPay address for the funds
and the amount of value to transfer.
When the Primary transaction is executed, the FastPay
smart contract generates a Primary event that instructs author-
ities of a change in the state of the FastPay smart contract. We
assume that each authority runs a full Primary client to authen-
ticate such events. For simplicity, we model such an event as
a (Primary) synchronization order (Ë). The smart contract
ensures this event and the synchronization order contain a
unique, always increasing, sequential transaction index.
When receiving a synchronization order, each authority
(i) checks that the transaction index follows the previously
recorded one, (ii) increments the last transaction index in their
global state, (iii) creates a new FastPay account if needed, and
(iv) increases the account balance of the target account by
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Figure 4: Transfer of funds from FastPay to the Primary.
the amount of value specified (Ì). Appendix B presents the
authority algorithm for handling funding transactions.
Transferring funds from FastPay to the Primary. Figure 4
shows a transfer of funds from FastPay to the Primary. The
FastPay sender signs a Primary transfer order using their
account key and broadcasts it to the authorities (Ê). This is
simply a transfer order with a Primary address as the recipient.
Once a quorum of signatures is reached (Ë and Ì), the
sender creates a certified (Primary) transfer order, also called
a transfer certificate for short. The sender broadcasts this cer-
tificate to the authorities to confirm the transaction (Í) and
unlock future spending from this account. When an author-
ity receives a confirmation order containing a certificate of
transfer (Î), it must check (i) that a quorum of signatures was
reached, and (ii) that the account sequence number matches
the expected one; they (iii) then set the pending order to
None, (iv) increment the sequence number, and (v) decrease
the account balance.
Finally, the recipient of the transfer should send a redeem
transaction to the FastPay smart contract on the Primary
blockchain (Ï). When the FastPay smart contract receives
a valid redeem transaction (Ð), it must (i) check that the se-
quence number is not in the Primary redeem log of the sender,
to prevent reuse; (ii) update this redeem log; (iv) transfer the
amount of value specified from the smart contract into the
recipient’s Primary account.
4.4 State Recovery and Auditing
For every account a, each authority α must make
available the pending order pendinga(α), the sequence
number next_sequencea(α), the synchronization orders
synchronizeda(α), and the certificates confirmed so far,
indexed by senders (i.e. confirmeda(α)) and receivers
(receiveda(α)). Sharing these data fulfills two important
roles: (i) this lets anyone read the state of any incomplete
transfer and drive the protocol all the way to settlement; (ii)
it enables auditing authority states and detecting Byzantine
faults (e.g. incorrect balance checks).
4.5 Correct Users and Client Implementation
A correct user owning a FastPay account a follows the cor-
rectness rules below:
1. The user sets the sequence number of a new transfer
order O to be the next expected integer after the previ-
ous transfer (starting with 0); i.e. they sign exactly one
transfer order per sequence number;
2. They broadcast the new transfer order O to enough au-
thorities until they (eventually) obtain a certificate C;
3. They successfully broadcast the certificate C to a quorum
of authorities.
FastPay Client. To address the correctness rules above, our
reference implementation of a FastPay client holds and per-
sists the following minimal state:
• The address a and the secret key of the account;
• The FastPay committee;
• The sequence number to be used in the next transfer;
• The transfer order that it signed last, in case it is still
pending.
In this setting, the available balance of a user account is not
tracked explicitly but rather evaluated (conservatively) from
the Primary transactions and the available logs for incoming
transfers and outgoing transfers (Section 4.4). Evaluating the
balance before starting a transfer is recommended, as signing
a transfer order with an excessive amount will block (correct)
client implementations from initiating further transfers until
the desired amount is available.
5 Security Analysis
Let σ denote the current state of the Primary. We define
fundinga(σ) as the sum of all the amounts transferred to a
FastPay address a from the Primary:
fundinga(σ) = ∑{
T ∈ transactions(σ)
recipient(T ) = a
amount(T )
For simplicity, we write∑C amount(C) when we mean to sum
over certified transfer orders: ∑O s.t. ∃C.O=value(C) amount(O).
The results presented in this section are proven in Ap-
pendix A. We start with the main safety invariant of FastPay.
Theorem 1 (Solvency of FastPay). At any time, the sum of the
amounts of all existing certified transfers from FastPay to the
Primary cannot exceed the funds collected by all transactions
on the Primary smart contract:
∑
recipient(C)∈Primary
amount(C) ≤ ∑
a
fundinga(σ)
7
Next, we describe how receivers of valid transfer certifi-
cates can finalize transactions and make funds available on
their own accounts (Primary and FastPay).
Proposition 1 (Redeemability of valid transfer certificates
to Primary). A new valid Primary transfer certificate C can
always be redeemed by sending a new redeem transaction T
to the smart contract.
Proposition 2 (Redeemability of valid transfer certificates
to FastPay). Any user can eventually have a valid FastPay
transfer certificate C confirmed by any honest authority.
Specifically, in Proposition 2, the confirmation order for
C is guaranteed to succeed for every honest authority α,
provided that the user first recovers and transfers to α all
the missing certificates required by α, defined as the se-
quence Ck . . .Cn−1 such that k = next_sequencea(α), a =
sender(C), n = sequence(C), sender(Ci) = a (k ≤ i ≤
n−1). The fact that no other certificates need to be confirmed
(e.g. to credit the balance of sender(C) itself) is closely re-
lated to the possibility of (temporary) negative balances for
authorities, and justified by the proof of safety in Appendix A.
Note that having a FastPay certificate confirmed by an
authorityα only affects α’s recipient and the sender’s balances
(i.e. redeems the certificate) the first time it is confirmed.
Finally, we state that FastPay funds credited on an account
can always be spent. We write received(a) for the set of
incoming transfer certificates C such that recipient(C) = a
and C is known to the owner of the account a.
Proposition 3 (Availability of transfer certificates). Let a be
an account owned by a correct user, n be the next available
sequence number after the last signed transfer order (if any,
otherwise n = 0), and O be a new transfer order signed by a
with sequence(O) = n and sender(O) = a.
Assume that the owner of a has secured enough funds for
a new order O based on their knowledge of the chain σ, the
history of outgoing transfers, and the set received(a). That
is, formally:(
amount(O) + ∑{ sender(C) = a
sequence(C)< n
amount(C)
)
≤
(
fundinga(σ) + ∑C∈received(a) amount(C)
)
Then, for any honest authority α, the user will always even-
tually obtain a valid signature of O from α after sending the
following orders to α:
1. A synchronization order from the Primary based on the
known state σ;
2. A confirmation order for every C ∈ received(a), pre-
ceded by all the missing certificates required by α (if
any) for the sender of C;
3. Then, the transfer order O.
Worst-case efficiency of FastPay clients. To initiate a trans-
fer (Proposition 3) or receive funds (Proposition 2) from
a sender account a, a FastPay client must address a quo-
rum of authorities. During the exchange, each authority
α may require missing certificates Ck . . .Cn−1, where k =
next_sequencea(α) is provided by α. In an attempt to slow
down the client, a Byzantine authority could return k = 0
and/or fail to respond at some point. To address this, a client
should query each authority α in parallel. After retrieving the
sequence number k, the required missing certificates should
be downloaded sequentially, in reverse order, then forwarded
to α. Given that FastPay client operations succeed as soon as a
quorum of authorities completes their exchanges, this strategy
ensures client efficiency despite Byzantine authorities.
6 Implementation
We implemented both a FastPay client and a networked multi-
core multi-shard FastPay authority in Rust, using Tokio3 for
networking and ed25519-dalek4 for signatures. For the ver-
ification of the multiple signatures composing a certificate
we use ed25519 batch verification. To reduce latency we use
UDP for FastPay requests and replies, and make the core of
FastPay idempotent to tolerate retries in case of packet loss;
we also provide an experimental FastPay implementation us-
ing exclusively TCP. Currently, data-structures are held in
memory rather than persistent storage.
We implement an authority shard as a separate operating
system process with its own networking and Tokio reactor
core, to validate the low overhead of intra-shard coordination
(through message passing rather than shared memory). We
experimented with manually pinning processes to physical
cores without a noticeable increase in performance through
the Linux taskset feature. It seems the Linux OS does a
good job in distributing processes and keeping them on in-
active cores. We also experimented with a single process
multi-threaded implementation of FastPay, using a single
Tokio reactor for all shards on multi-core machines. However,
this led to significantly lower performance, and therefore we
opted for using separate processes even on a single machine
for each shard. The exact bottleneck justifying this lower
performance—whether at the level of Tokio multi-threading
or OS resource management—still eludes us.
The implementation of both server and client is less than
4,000 LOC (of which half are for the networking), and a
further 1,375 LOC of unit tests. It required about 2.5 months
of work for 3 engineers, and a bit over 1,500 git commits.
Keeping the core small required constant re-factoring and its
simplicity is a significant advantage of the proposed FastPay
design.
3https://tokio.rs
4https://github.com/dalek-cryptography/ed25519-dalek
8
7 Evaluation
We evaluate the throughput and latency of our implementation
of FastPay through experiments on AWS. We particularly aim
to demonstrate that (i) sharding is effective, in that it increases
throughput linearly as expected; (ii) latency is not overly
affected by the number of authorities or shards, and remains
near-constant, even when some authorities fail; and (iii) that
the system is robust under extremely high concurrency and
transaction loads.
7.1 Microbenchmarks
We report on microbenchmarks of the single-CPU core time
required to process transfer orders, authority signed partial
certificates, and certificates. Table 1 displays the cost of each
operation in micro seconds (µs) assuming 10 authorities (re-
call 1µs = 10−6s); each measurement is the result of 500 runs
on an Apple laptop (MacBook Pro) with a 2.9 GHz Intel
Core i9 (6 physical and 12 logical cores), and 32 GB 2400
MHz DDR4 RAM. The first 3 rows respectively indicate the
time to create and serialize (i) a transfer order, (ii) a partial
certificate signed by a single authority, and (iii) a transfer
certificate as part of a confirmation order. The last 3 rows
indicate the time to deserialize them and check their valid-
ity. The dominant CPU cost involves the deserialization and
signature check on certificates (236µs), which includes the
batch verification of the 8 signatures (7 from authorities and
1 from sender). However, deserializing orders (58µs) and
votes (60µs) is also expensive: it involves 1 signature verifi-
cation (no batching) and creating 1 signature. Those results
indicate that a single core shard implementation may only
settle just over 4,000 transactions per second—highlighting
the importance of sharding to achieve high-throughput.
In terms of networking costs, a transfer order is 146 bytes,
and the signed response is 293 bytes. This could be reduced
by only responding with a signature (64 bytes) rather than
the full signed order, but we chose to echo back the order to
simplify client implementations. A full certificate for an order
is 819 bytes, and the response—consisting of an update on the
state of the FastPay account—is 51 bytes. For deployments
using many authorities we can compress certificates by using
an aggregate signature scheme (such as BLS [8]). However,
verification CPU costs of BLS only make this competitive
for committees larger than 50-100 authorities. We note that
all FastPay message types fit within the common maximum
transmission unit of commodity IP networks, allowing re-
quests and replies to be executed using a single UDP packet
(assuming no packets loss and 10 authorities).
7.2 Throughput
We deploy a FastPay multi-shard authority on Amazon Web
Services (Stockholm, eu-north-1 zone), on a m5d.metal in-
Measure Mean (µs) Std. (µs)
Create & Serialize Order 27 1
Create & Serialize Partial Cert. 27 2
Create & Serialize Certificate 4 0
Deserialize & Check Order 58 1
Deserialize & Check Partial Cert. 60 1
Deserialize & Check Certificate 236 10
Table 1: Microbenchmark of single core CPU costs of FastPay operations;
average and standard deviation of 500 measurements for 10 authorities.
stance. This class of instance guarantees 96 virtual CPUs
(48 physical cores), on a 2.5 GHz, Intel Xeon Platinum 8175,
and 384 GB memory. The operating system is Linux Ubuntu
server 18.04, where we increase the network buffer to about
96MB. In all graphs, each measurement is the average of
9 runs, and the error bars represent one standard deviation;
all experiments use our UDP implementation. We measure
the variation of throughput with the number of shards. Our
baseline experiment parameters are: 4 authorities (for con-
firmation orders), a load of 1M transactions, and applying
back-pressure to allow a maximum of 1000 concurrent trans-
actions at the time into the system (i.e. the in-flight parameter).
We then vary those baseline parameters through our experi-
ments to illustrate their impact on performance.
Robustness and performance under high concurrency.
Figures 5 and 6 respectively show the variation of the through-
put of processing transfer and confirmation orders as we in-
crease the number of shards per authority, from 15 to 85. We
measure those by processing 1M transactions, across 4 author-
ities. Figure 5 shows that the throughout of transfer orders
slowly increases with the number of shards. The in-flight
parameter—the maximum number of transactions that is al-
lowed into the system at any time—influences the throughput
by about 10%, and setting it to 1,000 seems optimal for per-
formance. The degree of concurrency in a system depends on
the number of concurrent client requests, and we observe that
FastPay is stable and performant even under extremely high
concurrency peaks of 50,000 concurrent requests. Afterwards,
the Operating System UDP network buffers fill up, and the
authority network stacks simply drop the requests.
Figure 6 shows that the throughput of confirmation orders
initially increases linearly with the number of shards, and
then reaches a plateau at around 48 shards. This happens
because our experiments are run on machines with 48 phys-
ical cores, running at full speed, and 48 logical cores. The
in-flight parameter of concurrent requests does not influence
the throughput much, but setting it too low (e.g. at 100) does
not saturate our CPUs. These figures show that FastPay can
support up to 160,000 transactions per second on 48 shards
(about 7x the peak transaction rate of the Visa payments net-
work [45]) while running on commodity computers that cost
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Figure 5: Variation of the throughput of transfer orders with the number of
shards, for various levels of concurrency (in-flight parameter). The measure-
ments are run under a total load of 1M transactions.
less than 4,000 USD/month per authority5.
Robustness and performance under total system load.
Figures 11 and 12 (see Appendix C) show the variation of
the throughput of transfer and confirmation orders with the
number of shards, for various total system loads—namely
the total number of transactions in the test; they show that
the throughput is not affected by the system load. The tests
were performed with 4 authorities, and the client concurrency
in-flight parameter set to 1,000. These figures illustrate that
FastPay can process about 160,000 transactions per second
even under a total load of 1.5M transactions, and that the total
load does not significantly affect performance. These supple-
ment figures 5 and 6 that illustrate the concurrent transaction
rate (in-flight parameter) also does not influence performance
significantly (except when it is too low by under-utilizing the
system).
Readers may be surprised those measurements are key.
The key measurement work by Han et al. [23] compares a
number of permissioned systems under a high load, and shows
that for all of Hyperledger Fabric (v0.6 with PBFT) [26],
Hyperledger Fabric (v1.0 with BFT-Smart) [27], Ripple [15]
and R3 Corda v3.2 [39] the successful requests per second
drops to zero as the transaction rate increases to more than a
few thousands transactions per second (notably for Corda only
a few hundred). An important exception is Tendermint [10],
that maintains a processed transaction rate of about 4,000
to 6,000 transactions per second at a high concurrency rate.
Those findings were confirmed for Hyperledger Fabric that
reportedly starts saturating at a rate of 10,000 transactions per
second [34]. Our results demonstrate that FastPay continues
to be very performant even under the influence of extremely
5AWS reports a price of 5.424 USD/hour for their m5d.metal instances.
https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/pricing/on-demand (January 2020)
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Figure 6: Variation of the throughput of confirmation orders with the number
of shards, for various levels of concurrency (in-flight parameter). The certifi-
cates are issued by 4 authorities, and the measurements are run under a total
load of 1M transactions.
high rates of concurrent transactions (in-flight parameter) and
overall work load (total number of transactions processed), as
expected. This is apparently not the norm.
Influence of the number of authorities. As discussed in
Section 4, we expect that increasing the number of authorities
only impacts the throughput of confirmation orders (that need
to transfer and check transfer certificates signed by 2 f + 1
authorities), and not the throughput of transfer orders. Fig-
ure 7 confirms that the the throughput of confirmation orders
decreases as the number of authorities increases. FastPay
can still process about 80,000 transactions per second with
20 authorities (for 75 shards). The measurements are taken
with an in-flight concurrency parameter set to 1,000, and un-
der a load of 1M total transactions. We note that for higher
number of authorities, using an aggregate signature scheme
(e.g. BLS [8]) would be preferable since it would result in
constant time verification and near-constant size certificates.
However, due to the use of batch verification of signatures,
the break even point may be after 100 authorities in terms of
verification time.
7.3 Latency
We measure the variation of the client-perceived latency with
the number of authorities. We deploy several FastPay multi-
shard authorities on Amazon Web Services (all in Stockholm,
eu-north-1 zone), each on a m5d.8xlarge instance. This class
of instance guarantees 10Gbit network capacity, on a 3.1 GHz,
Intel Xeon Platinum 8175 with 32 cores, and 128 GB memory.
The operating system is Linux Ubuntu server 16.04. Each
instance is configured to run 15 shards. The client is run on an
Apple laptop (MacBook Pro) with a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9 (6
physical and 12 logical cores), and 32 GB 2400 MHz DDR4
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Figure 7: Variation of the throughput of confirmation orders with the number
of authorities, for various number of shards. The in-flight parameter is set to
1,000 and the system load is of 1M transactions.
RAM; and connected to a reliable WIFI network. We run
experiments with the client in two different locations; (i) in the
U.K. (geographically close to the authorities, same continent),
and (ii) in the U.S. West Coast (geographically far from the
authorities, different continent). Each measurement is the
average of 300 runs, and the error bars represent one standard
deviation; all experiments use our UDP implementation.
We observe that the client-authority WAN latency is low
for both transfer and confirmation orders; the latency is under
200ms when the client is in the U.S. West Coast, and about
50ms when the client is in the U.K. Figure 8 illustrates
the latency between a client creating and sending a transfer
order to all authorities, and receiving sufficient signatures
to form a transfer certificate (in our experiment we wait for
all authorities to reply to measure the worse case where f
authorities are Byzantine). The latency is virtually constant
as we increase the number of authorities, due to the client
emitting orders asynchronously to all authorities and waiting
for responses in parallel.
Figure 9 illustrates the latency to submit a confirmation
order, and wait for all authorities to respond with a success
message. It shows latency is virtually constant when increas-
ing the number of authorities. This indicates that the latency
is largely dominated by the network (and not by the verifica-
tion of certificates). However, since even for 10 authorities
a FastPay message fits within a network MTU, the variation
is very small. Due to our choice of using UDP as a transport
there is no connection initiation delay (as for TCP), but we
may observe packet loss under very high congestion condi-
tions. Authority commands are idempotent to allow clients to
re-transmit to overcome loss without sacrificing safety.
Performance under failures. Research literature suggests
permissioned blockchains based on (often leader-based) con-
sensus suffer an enormous performance drop when some
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Figure 8: Variation of the latency of transfer orders with the number of
authorities, for various locations of the client.
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Figure 9: Variation of the latency of confirmation orders with the number of
authorities, for various locations of the client.
authorities fail [30]. We measure the effect of authority fail-
ure in FastPay and show that latency is not affected when f
or fewer authorities are unavailable.
f Latency
(ms ± std)
0 43±2
1 41±3
2 44±4
3 47±2
Table 2: Crash-failure
Latency.
We run our baseline experimen-
tal setup (10 authorities distributed
over 10 different AWS instances),
when a different number of author-
ities are not available for f = 0 . . .3.
We measure the latency experienced
by a client on the same continent (Eu-
rope), sending a transfer order until it
forms a valid transfer certificate. Ta-
ble 2 summarizes the mean latency
and standard deviation for different
f . There is no statistically significant difference in latency, no
matter how many tolerable failures FastPay experiences (up to
f ≤ 3 for 10 authorities). We also experimented with killing
11
authorities one by one with similar results, up to f > 3 when
the system did observably lose liveness as expected. The
underlying reason for the steady performance under failures
is FastPay’s lack of reliance on a leader to drive the protocol.
8 Limitations and Future Work
Threats to validity of experiments. Our experiments repre-
sent the best case performance, for a set number of authorities
and shards, as they are performed in laboratory conditions. In
particular, real-wold transactions may have the same sender
account, which would prevent them from being executed in
parallel. Further, the throughput evaluation places transaction
load on an authority through the local network interface, and
therefore does not take fully into account the operating sys-
tem networking costs of a full WAN stack. Further, our WAN
latency experiments were performed against authorities with
very low-load. Finally, the costs of persisting databases to
storage are not taken into account when measuring latency
and throughput (we leave the implementation of low-latency
persistent storage to future work).
Integrating privacy. As presented, FastPay exposes infor-
mation about all transactions, namely the sender-recipient
accounts and the amounts transferred, as well as the timings
of those transfers. Fully integrating stronger privacy protec-
tions is a separate research project. However, we want to
highlight that the architecture of FastPay is highly compat-
ible with threshold issuance selective disclosure credential
designs, such as Coconut [43]. In those schemes a threshold
of authorities can jointly sign a credential that the user can
subsequently randomize and present to execute a payment.
Implementing hidden balances, like MinbleWinble [35] and
combining them with credentials should be possible—but
beyond the scope of the present work.
Checkpointing, authority, and key rotation. The impor-
tant enabler for the good performance of FastPay, but also
an important limitation, is the fact that authorities do not
need to reach consensus on the state of their databases. We
demonstrate that payments are secure in this context, but vari-
ous system maintenance operations are harder to implement.
For example, checkpointing the state of all accounts in the
systems, to compress the list of stored certificates would be
beneficial, but cannot be straightforwardly implemented with-
out consensus. Similarly, it would be beneficial for authorities
to be able to rotate in and out of the committee, as well as to
update their cryptographic signature keys. Due to the lack of
tight synchronization between authorities there is no natural
point that guarantees they all update their committees at the
same logical time. Further, our proofs of liveness under asyn-
chrony presume that transfer orders and certificates that were
once valid, will always be valid. Integrating such governance
features into FastPay will require careful design to safely
leverage either some timing (synchrony) assumptions or use
a more capable (but maybe lower performance) consensus
layer, such as one facilitated by the Primary.
Economics and fees. Some cost to insert transactions into a
system (like fees in Bitcoin), allows for sound accounting and
prevents Denial of Service attacks by clients over-using an
open system. The horizontal scalability of FastPay alleviates
somehow the need to integrate such a scheme, since issues of
capacity can be resolved by increasing its capacity through
more shards (as well as deploying network level defenses).
However, if there was a need to implement fees for using
FastPay we would not recommend using micro-payments as-
sociated with each payment like in Bitcoin. We would rather
recommend allowing a client to deposit some payment into
a service account with all authorities, and then allow them
to deduct locally some of this fee for any services rendered
(namely any signed transfer order or confirmation order pro-
cessed). In practical terms, the variable costs of processing
transactions in FastPay is low. There is no artificial shortage
due to lack of scalability, and a flat periodic fee on either
senders or recipients might be sufficient to support operations
(rather than a charge per transaction).
9 Related Works
We compare FastPay with traditional payment systems and
some relevant crypto-currencies.
Traditional payment systems. In the context of traditional
payment systems FastPay is a real-time gross settlement sys-
tem (RTGS) [3, 5]—payments are executed in close to real-
time, there is no netting between participants, and the transfer
of funds is final upon the full payment protocol terminating.
All payments are pre-funded so there is no need to keep track
of credit or liquidity, which makes the design vastly simpler.
FastPay, from an assurance and performance perspective
is significantly superior to deployed RTGS systems: it (i)
implements a fully Byzantine fault tolerant architecture (es-
tablished systems rely on master-slave configurations to only
recover from few crash failures), (ii) has higher throughput
(as compared, for example with the TARGET2 [20] European
Central Bank RTGS systems that has a target throughput of
500 tx/sec), and (iii) has faster finality (as compared to TAR-
GET2 providing finality of a few seconds). Since FastPay
allows for fast gross settlement, participants are not exposed
to credit risk, as in the case of retail payment systems such as
VISA and Mastercard (that use daily netting, and have com-
plex financial arrangements to mitigate credit risk in case of
bank default). Furthermore, it does achieve both throughput
and latency, comparable to those systems combined—about
80,000 tx/sec at peak times, when adding up the throughput
of Visa and Mastercard together [24, 45].
On the downside, FastPay lacks certain features of mature
RTGS systems: in particular it does not support Delivery-on-
Payment transactions that atomically swap securities when
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payment is provided, or Payment-versus-Payment, that atom-
ically swap amounts in different currencies to minimize the
risk of foreign exchange transactions. These require atomic
operations across accounts controlled by different users, and
would therefore require extending FastPay to support them
(namely operations with consensus number of 2 per Her-
lihy [25]), which we leave for future work.
Crypto-currencies. FastPay provides high assurance in the
context of Byzantine failures within its infrastructure. In
that respect it is comparable with systems encountered in the
space of permissioned blockchains and crypto-currencies, as
well as their eco-system of payment channels. FastPay is per-
missioned in that the set of authorities managing the system
is closed—in fact we do not even propose a way to rotate
those authorities and leave this to future work. Qualitatively,
FastPay differs from other permissioned (or permissionless)
crypto-currencies in a number of ways: it is secure under
full network asynchrony (since it does not require or rely on
atomic broadcast channels or consensus, but only consistent
broadcast)—leading to higher performance. This direction
was explored in the past in relation to central bank crypto-
currency systems [17] and high performance permissionless
systems [40]. It was recently put on a formal footing by
Guerraroui et al. [22]. Our work extends this theory to allow
increased concurrency, correctness under sharding, and rigor-
ous interfacing with external settlement mechanisms. FastPay
achieves auditability through a set of certificates signed by
authorities rather than a sequential log of actions (blockchain),
which would require authorities to reach agreement on a com-
mon sequence.
Quantitatively, compared with other permissioned systems
FastPay is extremely performant. HyperLedger Fabric [11]
running with 10 nodes achieves about 1,000 transactions per
second and a latency of about 10 seconds [34]; and Libra [13]
and Corda [9, 38] achieve similar performance. JP Morgan
developed a digital coin built from the Ethereum codebase,
which can achieve about 1,500 transactions per second with
four nodes, and imposing a block time of 1 second [2]. Tender-
mint [10] reportedly achieves 10,000 transactions per second
with 4 nodes, with a few seconds latency [28]. However, as
we discussed in Section 7, many of those systems see their per-
formance degrading dramatically under heavy load—whereas
FastPay performs as expected.
FastPay can be used as a side chain of any crypto-currency
with reasonable finality guarantees, and sufficient programma-
bility. As compared to bilateral payment channels it is su-
perior in that it allows users to pay anyone in the system
without locking liquidity into the bilateral channel, and is
fully asynchronous. However, FastPay does rely on an as-
sumption of threshold non-Byzantine authorities for safety
and liveness, whereas payment channel designs only rely on
network synchrony for safety and liveness (safety may be
lost under conditions of asynchrony). As compared to pay-
ment channel networks (such as the lighting network [36])
FastPay is simpler and does not require complex path finding
algorithms [21, 36, 37, 42].
10 Conclusion
FastPay is a settlement layer based on consistent broadcast
channels, rather than full consensus. The FastPay design
leverages the nature of payments to allow for asynchronous
payments into accounts, and optional interactions with an
external Primary to build a practical system, while providing
proofs of both safety and liveness; it also proposes and eval-
uates a design for sharded implementation of authorities to
horizontally scale and match any throughput need.
The performance and robustness of FastPay is beyond and
above the state of the art, and validates that moving away
from both centralized solutions and full consensus to man-
age pre-funded retail payments has significant advantages.
Authorities can jointly process tens of thousands of transac-
tions per second (we observed a peak of 160,000 tx/sec) using
merely commodity hardware and lean software. A payment
confirmation latency of less than 200ms between continents
make FastPay practical for point of sale payments—where
goods and services need to be delivered fast and in person.
Pretty much instant settlement enables retail payments to be
freed from intermediaries, such as banks payment networks,
since they eliminate any credit risk inherent in deferred net-
ted end-of-day payments, that underpin today most national
Fast Payment systems [7]. Further, FastPay can tolerate up
to one-third of authorities crashing or even becoming Byzan-
tine without losing either safety or liveness (or performance).
This is in sharp contrast with existing centralized settlement
layers operating on specialized mainframes with a primary
/ backup crash fail strategy (and no documented technical
strategy to handle Byzantine operators). Surprisingly, it is
also in contrast with permissioned blockchains, which have
not achieved similar levels of performance and robustness
yet, due to the complexity of engineering and scaling full
Byzantine Fault-Tolerant consensus protocols.
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A Proofs of Security
This section proofs the results presented in Section 5.
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A.1 Additional Notations
We define fundinga(α) as the sum of all the amounts re-
ceived from the Primary by a FastPay address a, as seen at a
given time by an authority α:
fundinga(α) = ∑
S∈synchronizeda(α)
amount(S)
A.2 Safety
Lemma 1 (Transfer certificate uniqueness). If{
sender(C) = sender(C′), and
sequence(C) = sequence(C′)
then C and C′ certify the same transfer order:
value(C) = value(C′)
Proof. Both certificates C and C′ are signed by a quorum of
authorities. By construction, any two quorums intersect on
at least one honest authority. Let α be an honest authority in
both quorums. α signs at most one transfer order per sequence
number, thus C and C′ certify the same transfer order.
Lemma 2 (FastPay invariant). For every honest authority α,
for every account a, it holds that(
balancea(α) + ∑C∈confirmeda(α) amount(C)
)
≤
(
fundinga(α) + ∑C∈receiveda(α) amount(C)
)
Besides, if n = next_sequencea(α), we have that
confirmeda(α) = {C0 . . .Cn−1} for some certificates Ck such
that sequence(Ck) = k and sender(Ck) = a.
Proof. By construction of the FastPay authorities (Figure 2
and Figure 10): Whenever a confirmed certificate C is
added to confirmeda(α), balancea(α) is decreased by
amount(C), and next_sequencea(α) is incremented into
sequence(C)+ 1. Any new synchronization order equally
increases balancea(α) and fundinga(α). Whenever a con-
firmed certificate C is added to receiveda(α), possibly later
(due to cross-shard updates), balancea(α) is increased once
by amount(C).
Lemma 3 (Primary invariant). The total balance of all Fast-
Pay accounts on Primary is such that
total_balance(σ) =
(
∑a fundinga(σ)−
∑C∈redeemed(σ) amount(C)
)
Proof. By construction of the smart contract handling fund-
ing and redeeming transactions (Section 4.3): whenever
a funding transaction T is executed by the smart con-
tract, both fundinga(σ) and total_balance(σ) increase
by amount(T ). Conversely, total_balance(σ) decreases
by amount(C) whenever a Primary transfer certificate C is
redeemed on-chain and added to redeemed(σ).
Lemma 4 (Funding log synchronization). For every honest
authority α and every account a, it holds that
fundinga(α)≤ fundinga(σ)
Proof. By definition of the synchronization with the Primary
(Section 4.3), and by security of the Primary and its client,
fundinga(α) only increases after a funding transaction has
already increased fundinga(σ) by the same amount.
Lemma 5 (Balance check). For every honest authority α,
whenever O = pendinga(α) holds, then we also have
amount(O)≤ balancea(α)
Proof. By construction of the FastPay authorities (Figure 2),
if O = pendinga(α), then O was successfully processed
by α as a new transfer order from account a. At the time
of the request, amount(O) did not exceed the current bal-
ance B. Since O is still pending, in the meantime, no other
transfer certificates from account a have been confirmed by
α. (A confirmation would reset the field pending and pre-
vent O from being pending again due to the increased se-
quence number.) Therefore, the balance did not decrease, and
balancea(α)≥ B≥ amount(O).
Proposition 4 (Account safety). For every account a, at any
given time, we have that
∑sender(C)=a amount(C) ≤
fundinga(σ) + ∑recipient(C)=a amount(C)
Proof. Let n be the highest sequence number of a transfer cer-
tificate Cn from a. Let α an honest authority whose signature
is included in the certificate. At the same of signature, we
had value(Cn) = pendinga(α), therefore by Lemma 2 and
Lemma 5:(
amount(Cn) + ∑C∈confirmeda(α) amount(C)
)
≤
(
fundinga(α) + ∑C∈receiveda(α) amount(C)
)
Given that n is the highest sequence number, by Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, the left-hand term exactly covers the certified trans-
fer orders from a and is equal to ∑sender(C)=a amount(C).
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Given that amounts are non-negative, for every honest node
α, we have
∑
C∈receiveda(α)
amount(C) ≤ ∑
recipient(C)=a
amount(C)
Finally, fundinga(α)≤ fundinga(σ) by Lemma 4.
Proof of Theorem 1 (Solvency). By applying Proposition 4
on every account and summing, we obtain:
∑a fundinga(σ)≥(
∑C amount(C)−∑recipient(C)∈FastPay amount(C)
)
= ∑recipient(C)∈Primary amount(C)
A.3 Liveness
Proof of Proposition 1 (Redeeming to Primary). Theorem 1
shows that the smart contact always has enough funding
for all certified Primary transfer orders. The definition of
redeemed(σ) (Section 4.3) thus ensures that any new certi-
fied Primary transfer order can be redeemed exactly once.
Proof of Proposition 2 (Redeeming certificates to FastPay).
If a certificate C exists for account a and sequence number n,
this means at least f +1 honest authorities contributed signa-
tures to the transfer order O = value(C). By construction of
FastPay, these authorities have received (Figure 2) and will
keep available (Section 4.4) all the previous confirmation
orders C0 . . .Cn−1 with sender(Ck) = a, sequence(Ck) = k.
Therefore, any client can retrieve them and eventually bring
any other honest authority up to date with C.
Proof of Proposition 3 (Availability of certificates). Let B≥
amount(O) be the following value evaluated at the time of
the creation of the new transfer order O:
B =
(
fundinga(σ) − ∑{ sender(C) = a
sequence(C)< n
amount(C)
+ ∑C∈received(a) amount(C)
)
By a case analysis similar to the proof of Lemma 2, pro-
vided that the owner of a is communicating the informa-
tion described in Proposition 3 to the authority α, it will
hold eventually that balancea(α) ≥ B ≥ amount(O) and
next_sequencea(α) = n. We deduce that eventually α will
accept the transfer order O and make the value of its signed
(pending) order available.
A.4 Performance under Byzantine Failures
The FastPay protocol does not rely on any designated leader
(like PBFT [14]) to make progress or create proposals; Fast-
Pay authorities do not directly communicate with each other,
and their actions are symmetric. Clients create certificates by
gathering the first 2 f +1 responses to a valid transfer order,
and no action of a Byzantine authority may delay the creation
of a certificate. A Byzantine authority may not even present
a signature on a different order as a response to confuse a
correct client, since it would have to be signed by the correct
payer. Subsequently, a correct client submits the confirmation
order to all authorities. Again, Byzantine authorities cannot
in any way delay honest authorities from processing the pay-
ment locally in their databases, and enabling a subsequent
payment for the sending account.
Byzantine clients may attempt denial of service attacks by
over-using the system, and for example creating a very large
number of receiving accounts (this could be disincentivized
by charging some fee for an account creation). However, an
attempt to equivocate by sending two transfer orders for a sin-
gle sequence number could either result in their own account
being locked (no single transfer order can achieve 2 f +1 sig-
natures to form a certificate and move to the next sequence
number), or one of them succeeding—neither of which de-
grade performance. Transfer orders with insufficient funds or
incorrect sequence numbers are simply rejected, which does
not significantly affect performance (if anything they do not
result in confirmation orders that are more costly to process
than transfer orders, see Section 7).
B Code Listings for Core Operations
Algorithms for the core authority operations are simplified
directly from the Rust implementation. We omit explicit
typing, details of error messages returned, de-referencing,
and managing variable ownership. The macro ensure, returns
with an error unless the condition is fulfilled, and bail always
returns with an error.
C Additional Figures
Figures 11 and 12 show the increase of throughput of transfer
and confirmation orders with the number of shards, for various
total system loads. They complement Section 7.2 by showing
that the throughput is not affected by the system load.
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fn handle_cross_shard_commit(α, C) -> Result {
let O = value(C);
let recipient = match recipient(O) {
Address::FastPay(recipient) => recipient ,
Address::Primary(_) => { bail!(); }
};
ensure!(α.in_shard(recipient));
let recipient_account = accounts(α).get(recipient)
.or_insert(AccountState::new());
recipient_account.balance += amount(O);
Ok()
}
fn handle_primary_synchronization_order(α, S) -> Result {
/// Update recipient(S) assuming that S comes from
/// a trusted source (e.g. Primary client).
let recipient = recipient(S);
ensure!(α.in_shard(recipient));
if transaction_index(S) <= last_transaction(α) {
/// Ignore old synchronization orders.
return Ok();
}
ensure!(transaction_index(S) == last_transaction(α) + 1);
last_transaction(α) += 1;
let recipient_account = accounts(α).get(recipient)
.or_insert(AccountState::new());
recipient_account.balance += amount(S);
recipient_account.synchronized.push(S);
Ok()
}
Figure 10: Authority algorithms for cross-shard updates and (Primary) syn-
chronization orders.
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Figure 11: Variation of the throughput of transfer orders with the number of
shards, for various loads. The in-flight parameter is set to 1,000.
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Figure 12: Variation of the throughput of confirmation orders with the number
of shards, for various loads. The certificates are issued by 4 authorities, and
the in-flight parameter is set to 1,000.
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